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Abstract  
By means of a reductio argument, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus calls into question the very idea that 
we can represent logical form. My paper addresses three interrelated questions: first, what con-
ception of logical form is at issue in this argument? Second, whose conception of logic is this 
argument intended to undermine? And third, what could count as an adequate response to it? I 
show that the argument construes logical form as the universal, underlying correlation of any 
representation and the reality it represents. I further show that the argument seeks to undermine 
core commitments of Frege’s and Russell’s. But the reductio, as I read it, is not intended to estab-
lish the falsity of any of their specific assumptions. Rather, it aim is to make manifest the inde-
terminacies that underly the language in which these assumptions are framed, and establish the 
need for a transformation of that language. So understood, Wittgenstein’s argument exemplifies 
his idea that philosophy is not a theory, but an activity of elucidation. The interpretation I pro-
pose bears on one of the central debates in the literature, namely how we should understand 
Wittgenstein’s contention that his elucidations succeed despite being nonsensical.   
1. Introduction 
A central claim of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is that while logical form 
“shows itself” whenever we use propositions, “What can be shown cannot be said” (TLP 
4.121-4.1212).  Indeed, Wittgenstein glosses his so-called “fundamental thought” with the claim 1
that “the logic of the facts cannot be represented” (4.0312). These ideas are notoriously difficult 
to make sense of, for it is unclear whether in saying of anything that it cannot be said we do not 
end up saying something about it after all. In other words, it is unclear whether with these claims 
Wittgenstein attempts to say something which by his own lights can only be shown but cannot be 
said, or whether his claims are simply nonsensical, and do not convey any content at all, in which 
case it would not be clear what role they might have. My aim in this paper is to investigate the 
line of argument in the context of which Wittgenstein frames these notorious claims. I argue that 
the argument forms part of the dialectical strategy by means of which Wittgenstein seeks to sub-
vert Frege’s and Russell’s approach to logic.  
Wittgenstein’s argument presents itself as a reductio ad absurdum of the assumption that 
 References to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Wittgenstein 1960) are abbreviated as ‘TLP’ 1
followed by paragraph numbers, except for the “Author’s Preface” which is cited by page num-
ber (26-27). 
logical form can be represented. Starting from the distinction between the content and form of 
representation, Wittgenstein argues that no representation can represent its own form (TLP 2.16-
2.174). But given the further assumption that logical form underlies any possible representation 
(2.18, 3.032) it seems to follow that there can be no representation of logical form (4.12).  
I propose to distinguish two ways of understanding the upshot of Wittgenstein’s argu-
ment. On what I will call the standard reading of the argument, its goal is to show that the as-
sumption that logic can be represented is incompatible with principles that make up Wittgen-
stein’s own account of logic and representation; the argument is taken to record Wittgenstein’s 
reasons for rejecting that assumption.  But this gives rise to a peculiar predicament: the conclu2 -
sion that logical form cannot be the topic of assertions seems to follow from premises that in-
volve assertions about logical form. As a remedy to this predicament, the standard reading ap-
peals to Wittgenstein’s distinction between what can be said and what can be shown (4.1212), 
since this distinction seems to be meant to allow Wittgenstein to indirectly convey substantive 
insights concerning the logical form of language and reality, while avoiding the obstacle that log-
ic cannot be directly represented. Thus although according to the standard reading the grounds of 
Wittgenstein’s theory are ineffable, it is a theory that he is taken to thereby provide.  
And yet in spelling out his conception of philosophy Wittgenstein expressly says that phi-
losophy is “not a theory but an activity” which essentially consists in elucidations (TLP 4.112). 
Philosophical elucidations, Wittgenstein explains, aim to effect a clarification of our language, 
and thereby allow us to overcome our philosophical confusions. Moreover, far from holding that 
his elucidations convey a commitment to substantive philosophical theses, in the penultimate 
paragraph of the book Wittgenstein urges us to throw away the ladder of elucidations on which 
we have climbed up, for once we have reached clarity, we should no longer have any use for 
them (6.54). Taking these remarks as their starting point, proponents of the so-called “resolute” 
reading of the Tractatus reject the standard reading’s construal of Wittgenstein’s aims.  The al3 -
ternative construal of Wittgenstein’s reductio that I propose in this paper is meant to lend support 
to the resolute approach. 
The alternative reading of the argument, which I will defend, is guided both by Wittgen-
stein’s methodological reflections in the Tractatus as well as by his later reflections on the differ-
ent ways in which one might react to the discovery of a contradiction in mathematical as well as 
in philosophical contexts. The inconsistencies that a reductio argument exposes, on this reading, 
reflect the presence of pervasive confusions that underlie our use of language, rather than the fal-
sity of this or that premise of the argument. Not only the expressions of the inconsistent theory, 
but the very questions which gave rise to them are thereby recognized to have lacked a determi-
nate sense. This is a general point Wittgenstein makes in the Preface to the Tractatus: the manner 
in which philosophical problems tend to be posed, Wittgenstein there says, reflects a misunder-
standing of the logic of our language (TLP 27 and 3.323-4). The proper response to the discovery 
 Proponents of the standard reading include Anscombe 1959 162, Geach 1976, Hacker 2001b 2
146, Williams 2004 21, Nordmann 2005 65, White 2006 122, and Zalabardo 2015 84, as well as 
Russell 1960 21-23, whose reading I discuss in Section 4.   
 Diamond 1991b; Kremer 2002; Conant and Diamond 2004; Narboux 2014. For an overview of 3
the debate between standard and resolute readers of the Tractatus, see Bronzo 2012.  
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of such underlying confusion, he goes on to suggests, is the transformation of the use of language 
within which those problems are couched (4.112). As a result, the problems would not be solved, 
but would rather be made to disappear (6.52-6.521 and 6.54). Importantly, in order to achieve 
this effect, no philosophical theses need to be relied on. Clarity will transpire by removing confu-
sions, not by metaphysical discovery (cf. 6.53).   
The Tractarian reductio, as I understand it, specifically aims to expose the indetermina-
cies that underly the way in which Frege and Russell frame their conception of logic, and thereby 
to point out the need for a transformation of their philosophical language. His goal is not, there-
fore, to show that some of their theses about logic and representation are false whereas others are 
true, but rather to show that there is no genuine, meaningful question to which the theses ad-
vanced by his predecessors provide an answer. Furthermore, since the elucidatory expressions in 
which the reductio consists themselves draw on the indeterminate use of language that they help 
us overcome, their success as elucidations requires that we come to recognize that they, too, are 
nonsensical. Wittgenstein therefore recommends that the ladder provided by the reductio ulti-
mately be thrown away.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 I reconstruct the ostensible form of 
Wittgenstein’s reductio, which the standard reading takes at face value. In Section 3 I assess the 
extent to which Frege and Russell can be said to be committed to the premises on which the ar-
gument draws. In Section 4 I consider Russell’s attempt to circumvent the reductio by rejecting 
one of the central premises of the argument while keeping the rest intact. In Section 5 I motivate 
the alternative construal of the role of reductio arguments, drawing on the later Wittgenstein’s 
reflections on the philosophy of mathematics, and I show that the germ of this construal is al-
ready to be found in Frege’s and Russell’s reflections on the admissibility of indirect proofs in 
laying the foundations of logic. In Sections 6 and 7 I argue that this alternative construal fits the 
Tractarian reductio, and I then clarify the way in which my suggestion lends support to the reso-
lute reading of the Tractatus.  
 2. The Ostensible Structure of Wittgenstein’s Reductio 
My initial aim is to spell out the ostensible form of the Tractarian reductio. I call it the ostensible 
form, for upon further reflection it will become difficult to see how one could accept the implica-
tions of the argument while continuing to treat the premises from which it takes its start as intel-
ligible. Nonetheless, the dialectical strategy of the Tractatus seems to target the kind of reader 
who, like Frege and Russell, does not suspect that there is anything amiss with the premises of 
the argument, apart from their possibly being false.  
The argument can be broken down into two main steps. In the first step, Wittgenstein dis-
tinguishes between the content of a representation and the form of representation that it employs, 
and argues that in order for a representation to represent its own form of representation, it would 
have to employ a different form of representation than the one that it purports to represent. He 
concludes that no picture can represent its own form of representation. Nonetheless, it still seems 
possible, at this stage of the argument, that a form of representation of one picture could be rep-
resented by means of a different picture, which employs a different form. In the second step of 
the argument this possibility is blocked. It is argued that all forms of representation presuppose 
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logical form, and from this the conclusion is drawn that logical form cannot be represented.  
The paradigmatic, basic case of representation that Wittgenstein addresses in the first step 
of the argument is that of a picture. According to Wittgenstein, if a picture is to count as a repre-
sentation at all, at least two conditions must be met. I call the first the condition of Common 
Form:
2.16 In order to be a picture a fact must have something in common with what it 
pictures. 
2.17 What the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to 
represent it after its manner—rightly or falsely—is its form of representation.
A form of representation is the medium within which certain features of the picturing fact be-
come significant. For by being common to the structure of the picture and the structure of the 
depicted fact, the form enables their systematic correlation (TLP 2.15-2.151). A relatively simple 
example for this is the case of spatial pictures that represent spatial states of affairs, where what 
is correlated are two structures that have spatial form; a more complicated example is the case of 
the gramophone record whose physical shape pictures a musical piece (4.0141), where the de-
picting fact and the depicted fact do not belong to the domain of a single form. The principle of 
Common Form thus states that what is common to all pictures, including those in which the pic-
ture and the depicted belong to radically heterogenous domains, is the availability of systematic 
correlation—a projection or mapping of the elements and structure of one fact onto the elements 
and structure of another (3.11-3.1432). 
The second condition that must be met by any pictorial representation is what I shall call 
Outsideness: 
2.173 The picture represents its object from outside (its standpoint is its form of 
representation), therefore the picture represents its object rightly or wrongly. 
The basic idea behind Outsideness is that representation as such involves a distinction between 
two coordinated but distinct facts — the picture and the pictured. One thing this implies is that 
nothing can count as its own representation. This sounds so trivial that one might think it is not 
even worth mentioning, but as we shall see it is far from being inconsequential.   4
Given Common Form and Outsideness, it results that no picture can represent its own 
form of representation. For whatever a picture represents, it must be “outside” of, but at the same 
time, any picture must be “within” the common form that it shares with its object. Wittgenstein 
concludes from this that the form of representation that enables a picture to depict some range of 
facts is not representable by that picture, or any picture of that same form: 
 See also TLP 4.041 and 5.61, as well as the the illuminating discussions of this feature of 4
Wittgenstein’s account of picturing in Diamond 1991b 186-193, Sullivan 2001 106 and and Zal-
abardo 2015 74. In the next section I continue to discuss Outsideness and its role in Wittgen-
stein’s Tractatus, as well as in the work of his predecessors. 
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2.174 The picture cannot place itself outside of its form of representation.
However, even though the form of a representation cannot be part of its content, it must some-
how be operative in our use of the picture if we are to interpret it as the picture it is. This drives 
Wittgenstein to qualify his conclusion: 
2.172  The picture, however, cannot represent its form of representation; it 
shows it forth.
Let us leave aside, for the moment, the task of coming to grips with Wittgenstein’s distinction 
between what is said and what is shown forth in a picture. What is crucial for present purposes is 
that Wittgenstein does not say (at least not yet) that the form of representation which shows forth 
in a picture could not be represented at all. Indeed, what he says seems to leave it open that this 
could be done by means of a different picture, which employs a different form of representation. 
Thus a regress of forms of representation seems to loom; and the second step of the argument can 
be taken to block this regress.  
The second step of the argument shifts the focus from pictorial representation to represen-
tation as such, including representation by means of propositions, in which, according to 
Wittgenstein, thought essentially consists (TLP 3, 4). This shift involves a complete abstraction 
from the natural correlations that may be found between the elements and structure of ordinary 
pictures and the elements and structure of the facts they depict: whereas in pictorial representa-
tion a red element in the picture might depict a red object by virtue of being red, the correlation 
of a proposition and the fact it represents does not depend on any material similarities. What re-
mains, despite the abstraction, is the least common factor which any representation must have 
with what it depicts. This is what Wittgenstein calls logical form: 
2.18 What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality 
in order to be able to represent it at all—rightly or falsely—is the logical form, 
that is, the form of reality. 
2.181  If the form of representation is the logical form, then the picture is called 
a logical picture.  
2.182 Every picture is also a logical picture. 
Wittgenstein here introduces the principle of the universality of logical form (or Universality, for 
short). Like spatiality, which informs all spatial representations, logical form is thought of as that 
which informs any representation of reality, and in particular, all language and thought. In articu-
lating what this bare medium of correlation involves, Wittgenstein explains that the structures of 
any picture and any depicted fact must have, at a minimum, the same “logical (mathematical) 
multiplicity” (4.04, 5.475). Of this multiplicity, too, Wittgenstein says that it cannot be represent-
ed at all, since “one cannot get outside it in the representation” (4.041). 
There are two interrelated features of Universality on which the reductio argument turns: 
the idea that logical form underlies all representation, without exception, and the idea that in 
speaking of logical form we are speaking of a single, unified form, or at any rate, a single net-
work of interconnected forms (TLP 2.18, 2.181, 3.032, 4.12, 4.121, 5.47, 5.511 and 6.124). This 
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is not to deny that there are places in the Tractatus in which the term ‘logical form’ admits of the 
plural, that is, places in which Wittgenstein speaks of the different logical forms of different 
types of sentences, e.g. sentences involving predicates ranging over different number of argu-
ments (3.315, 3.327, 4.0031, 4.128, 6.23). This plural notion of logical form is a central topic of 
Russell’s 1913 manuscript (Russell 2013), and Wittgenstein’s early Notebooks directly responds 
to Russell with an argument directed against the idea that logic can say anything about such 
forms (Wittgenstein 1984 2; cf. TLP 5.55-5.555). But the passages in which the Tractarian reduc-
tio is presented abstract from the particularity of logical forms and directly target the repre-
sentability of logical form as such (this is particularly evident in TLP 2.18-2.182, cited above, 
and 4.12, which is cited below). 
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I will have more to say about Universality in the next section, where I consider the vexed 
question of the extent to which anything like it may be attributed to Frege and Russell; I would 
here like to focus on the role it plays in the reductio. The regress of forms of representation 
which initially seemed possible in the case of pictorial forms of representation is blocked as soon 
as one introduces the principle of Universality. For it follows from Universality that there is no 
such thing as an illogical form of representation—there can be no common factor which does not 
involve that which is minimally and universally common (cf. TLP 3.03-3.0321, 5.4731, and 
Wittgenstein 1984 108). And it follows from Outsideness that if there is no such thing as stand-
ing outside logical form, then there is no representing it, at all. The entire second step of the ar-
gument appears, in highly condensed form, at TLP 4.12: 
  
4.12 Propositions can represent the whole reality, but they cannot represent what 
they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—the 
logical form. 
To be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to put ourselves 
with the proposition outside logic, that is outside the world.

The argument of 4.12 may be reconstructed as follows. The three principles of representation 
which I spelled out above seem to serve as uncontested premises in the argument. For conve-
nience, I repeat them here: 
Common Form: a representation and what it represents are correlated with one 
another by virtue of having a common form.  
Outsideness: a representation is distinct from what it represents.  
Universality: logical form is the least common denominator of all correlation.  
Let us call the assumption which is to be rejected by means of the reductio, on this construal, 
Representability. The first step of the reconstructed argument, (A), consists in the assertion of 
 If the Tractarian reductio were concerned with the representability of each particular logical 5
form, for the argument to produce a contradiction further assumptions would have to be added, 
e.g. that a representation that has one logical form could not have enough in common with other 
logical forms to count as their representation.
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this assumption: 
(A) Representability: We can make a representation of logical form.
Together with Outsideness, Representability yields (B):
(B) Such a representation of logical form would be outside its putative object, 
i.e. outside logical form.
I note again that the notion of logical form which is relevant for the argument, as I reconstruct it, 
is the singular, not plural; this explain why Wittgenstein says that “To be able to represent logical 
form, we should have to be able to put ourselves with the proposition outside logic.” Further-
more, note that although Wittgenstein does not fully spell out what he means by “standing out-
side,” it seems minimally to imply the distinction between two separate facts, such that no fact 
could be “outside” itself. When applied to the relation between a representation and its form, it 
implies that a representation which is outside of a certain form does not have that form. This 
construal of Outsideness would explain why Wittgenstein moves, in TLP 4.12 from (B) to 
(C) Such a representation of logical form would not itself have logical form.
Or in the words of 4.12, such a representation would be “outside logic.” Now given Universality, 
according to which logical form is the least common denominator of all forms of representation, 
it follows that
(D) Such a representation of logical form would not have anything in common 
with logical form.
But since this contradicts the principle of Common Form, it seems that we must reject Repre-
sentability and conclude
(E) We cannot make a representation of logical form. 
In the words of 4.12, “Propositions… cannot represent… the logical form”. For in trying to force 
a proposition to take the universal form of representation as its object, satisfying the condition of 
Outsideness requires that we violate the condition of Common Form, and vice versa. But nothing 
can be both within and outside its form. Hence nothing could count as a representation of logical 
form. Representability, it seems, is thereby shown to be false.  
3. Whose Views are Targeted by the reductio?  
Standard readings of the Tractarian reductio often assume that what is at stake in it is the status 
of a theory that Wittgenstein himself advocates. For example, Peter Geach says Wittgenstein 
deals himself a “self-mate” (Geach 1976 54); Peter Hacker takes Wittgenstein to be “sawing off 
the branch upon which he is sitting” (Hacker 2001a 102); and Alfred Nordmann explicitly states 
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that Wittgenstein subjects his own views to a reductio (Nordmann 2005 65). To avoid inconsis-
tency, Wittgenstein is taken by these standard readers to conclude that some of his theoretical 
commitments, though true, cannot be expressed; the distinction between saying and showing is 
supposedly meant to “ameliorate” the difficulty exposed by the reductio (Williams 2004 21; cf. 
Hacker 2001b 146).  By contrast, I will here argue that Wittgenstein targets not his own but 6
Frege’s and Russell’s views.  I will then proceed to clarify in what way Wittgenstein addresses 7
these views; what he aims for, I will argue, is not to expose these views as false but as nonsensi-
cal, and this calls for an alternative construal of the nature of the reductio argument. 
Whether Frege and Russell were committed to the views that Wittgenstein attributes to 
them is a controversial matter. In particular, there is an ongoing debate over whether a “univer-
salist conception of logic” should be attributed to Frege and Russell, that is, a conception of logic 
as the science concerned with the most general and universally applicable truths—it is worth not-
ing that several distinct points are run together in speaking of such a “universalist conception”, 
including in particular the two principles which I distinguished between above, Universality and 
Representability.  Since the question to what extent Frege and Russell espoused such a concep8 -
tion of logic cannot be fully settled in the present context, I propose to pursue a more modest 
aim, namely to clarify Wittgenstein’s intent, rather than the success of his critique. What I hope 
to show is that, given many things Frege and Russell do say, it was not implausible of Wittgen-
stein to take his predecessors to have espoused such views.    9
 For the resolute readers’ critique of this construal of the distinction see Conant and Diamond 6
2004 47ff.; I return to this issue in Section 7, below.
 A notable precursor of my proposal is Ricketts 1985, who argues that the Tractatus exposes a 7
tension in Frege, namely the tension between Frege’s idea that logic plays a constitutive role in 
guiding all acts of judgment (which is roughly equivalent to what I called Universality) and 
Frege’s construal of the logical axioms as substantively contentful (which is roughly equivalent 
to the assumption of Representability).  
 A further claim often made by those who take Frege and Russell to be universalists, on which I 8
do not wish to take a stance here, is that it follows from it that Frege and Russell are prevented 
from engaging in logical metatheory. Interpreters who defend the ascription of some such version 
of universalism to Frege and Russell include Van Heijenoort 1967, Goldfarb 1982, Ricketts 
1985, Hylton 1990 and 2005, and Kuusela 2019. The claim that Frege is prevented from engag-
ing in logical metatheory is contested by Stanley 1996, Tappenden 1997 and Heck 2007; on this 
see the response by Weiner 2005. Scholars who argue that not all aspects of the universalist con-
ception of logic are attributable to Russell include Proops 2007 (who nonetheless makes clear 
that some of these aspects are present in Russell’s earlier texts, especially the Principles of Math-
ematics) as well as Korhonen 2012 and Blanchette 2013. I discuss some further points made by 
Proops in fn. 13, below.
 Indeed the very fact that there is such a debate as the one described in the previous footnote 9
goes to show that it is not unnatural, and in fact quite tempting to read Frege’s and Russell’s 
work in ways that involve the attribution to them of something like the principle of Universali-
ty—which supports my claim that Wittgenstein himself had reasons to take them to endorse it.  
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Let us begin with Common Form. A version of this principle is appealed to in Frege’s ar-
gument that his formal language is preferable to Boole’s. According to Frege, his Begriffsschrift 
makes it easy to recognize the correspondence between the way its signs are concatenated and 
“the structure of concepts” which they express (Frege 1979b 12-13).  Russell appeals to a simi10 -
lar notion of common form in his multiple-relation account of judgment. One of the roles he 
gives to the element of judgment which he calls “logical form” is to guarantee that all its other 
elements are combined “in the right order”, i.e. in a way that corresponds to the structure of what 
is judged (Russell 2013 116). Furthermore, in his “Introduction” to the Tractatus, Russell says 
that Wittgenstein’s claim that logical form is common to the proposition and the fact it depicts is 
“In certain elementary ways… obvious.” (Russell 1960 xi). And, if I am right to suggest, as I will 
below, that Frege and Russell can plausibly be taken to endorse Universality, it is trivial to derive 
from this a commitment to the weaker principle of Common Form.  
What about Outsideness? As the word “therefore” in 2.173 (cited above) makes clear, 
with this principle Wittgenstein attempts to single out the feature of representations which en-
ables them to be truth-evaluable: it is because of the independence of the picture from what it 
depicts that it is capable of depicting states of affairs which do not actually exist, and in those 
cases to be evaluable as false. In this connection, Wittgenstein goes on to argue that the very 
meaningfulness of propositions, their having a sense, depends on their not presupposing their 
own truth (TLP 4.061; cf. 2.0211 and 3.24).  Now even though the early Russell propounded an 11
account of judgment which fails this test, both Frege and (slightly later) Russell advance theories 
that aim to meet the condition of Outsideness, so understood. Thus by means of his distinction 
between sense and reference, Frege guarantees that the meaningfulness of sentences is indepen-
dent of their truth-value (Frege 1997). And once Russell abandons his earlier account of proposi-
tions, he turns to develop a theory of judgment that aims to incorporate Outsideness without in-
troducing Fregean senses.  12
To what extent can the intended targets of Wittgenstein’s argument—Frege’s and Rus-
sell’s conceptions of logic—be taken to assume the Universality of logical form, understood as 
the claim that all thought and representation are governed by a single form or an interconnected 
network of forms, such that one cannot step outside it and yet still count as representing? Frege 
 And see the discussion of the affinity between Wittgenstein’s and Frege’s theories of represen10 -
tation in Johnston 2017.
 Zalabardo 2015 (74) offers a different construal of the principle I call Outsideness. According 11
to him for a picture to be truth-evaluable, the very existence of the picture must not imply the 
existence of that which it depicts. This condition is not met in the case of attempts to depict logi-
cal form, since such attempted depictions would have the very form which they depict, and this 
would mean that the existence of the depictions would guarantee the existence of what they de-
pict. I find this interpretation illuminating, but I believe there is not enough textual evidence to 
support it. 
 For Russell’s early view see Russell 1973, and the discussion in Hylton 1990 243-275. For the 12
mature view, see Russell 1905 and especially 2013, with which Wittgenstein was intimately fa-
miliar.
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says that logic is concerned not with any truth in particular, but with the “laws of truth” which 
are at the same time the “laws of thought.” These laws are not merely normative for all thinking 
(Frege 1984 351) they are constitutive of all judgment and inference (Frege 1979a 3). Since logi-
cal laws constitute the activity of justification, there is no external standpoint from which one can 
justify any of these laws; all one can do is show how each of them interconnects with the others 
(Frege 2013 xvii). Logic is for Frege, in this specific sense, the study of the single, unified, and 
absolutely general form of all thinking. This becomes particularly explicit when Frege addresses 
the question whether there might be such a thing as thought which is governed by an alternative 
logic, in the context of Frege’s polemic against the psychologistic logicians of his time, whose 
construal of logical laws in terms of natural laws governing the operation of brains renders these 
laws contingent (Frege 2013 xvi). The psychologistic logicians, Frege points out, thereby make 
room for the possibility of logical aliens, i.e. beings whose form of thinking corresponds to laws 
that contradict ours. But in the absence of agreement on common logical criteria, we could not 
evaluate what these aliens do in light of their laws as either correct or incorrect; and given that 
correctness is the constitutive goal of thinking, the very idea that what they do deserves to be 
called thinking, at all, is thereby shown to be incoherent. Frege further holds that to deny even a 
single basic principle of logic is no longer to engage in thinking; what it amounts to, Frege holds, 
is mere confusion (Frege 1960 21). 
In his Principles of Mathematics, Russell similarly holds that logic is concerned with the 
principles that govern “inference in general” (Russell 1903 11). Like Frege, Russell is lead from 
this commitment to Universality to the claim that it is not merely wrong, but impossible to co-
herently judge what is logically false. One place in which this becomes evident, both in Frege 
and in Russell, is their arguments against the employment of indirect proofs (the genus to which 
proofs by reductio belong) in laying the foundations of logic. Frege maintains that we cannot 
meaningfully assume the falsity of a logical axiom, even for the purpose of deriving a contradic-
tion, as this would require suspending the universal principles which constitutively govern our 
acts of thinking and judging (Frege 1980 79 and 182, Frege 1984 335, Frege 1960 21; and see 
Ricketts 1985 11). Russell, for his part, argues that assuming the falsity of a logical principle, e.g. 
in the context of an attempted indirect proof of their independence, would introduce an incoher-
ence into our body of thought, which could not be insulated and contained. He reasons that in 
allowing the negation of a logical principle into the proof, we would also legitimate the invalid 
forms of reasoning that are derivable from it. Russell’s worry is that nothing we would go on to 
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say in such a context would count as properly established (Russell 1903 15; cf. 454).  13
Russell’s views on logic shift considerably over the years, and there is an ongoing debate 
over whether and to what extent he can be taken to be committed to something like 
Universality.  The outcome of this debate should not matter for my present purposes, however, 14
since the question I am primarily concerned with is not what Russell actually thought at each and 
every point in his career, but whether Wittgenstein could plausibly take him to advocate Univer-
sality. The evidence I just cited, while perhaps not sufficient for conclusively settling the first 
question, is sufficient for answering the latter. Wittgenstein had reasons (at the very least, appar-
ent reasons) to take Russell to be committed to Universality. Moreover, as I will show in more 
detail in the next section, in his confrontation with Wittgenstein’s reductio Russell proposes that 
one could save the assumption that logical form is representable if one denied Universality. What 
he says there implies that Universality is a commitment that he previously made and that he now 
finds it very difficult to disown (Russell 1960 23). So Russell himself seems to confirm my line 
of reading.  
I now turn to the assumption which the reductio purports to refute, namely that logical 
form can be represented (A). To what extent and in what sense can Frege and Russell be taken to 
aim at representing logical form? The core of Frege’s and Russell’s logicist projects can be 
roughly described as the attempt to reduce the entirety of mathematical knowledge to the axioms 
which capture the most fundamental and self-evident laws of thought. The logical axioms are 
thus treated as sources of substantive knowledge. Drawing analogies between logical laws and 
scientific laws, Frege and Russell both treat logical propositions as substantive, contentful truths, 
i.e. as propositions that represent something, however general or abstract their content might be. 
In Frege’s case, the axioms are taken to capture the descriptive laws of the realm of truth (Frege 
1984b 351); Russell, for his part, says that “logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as 
zoology, though with its more abstract and general features” (Russell 1919 169).  
Wittgenstein’s reductio undercuts the idea that logical propositions amount to substantive 
 Proops 2007 (21-24), who contests the attribution to Russell of a universalist approach to log13 -
ic, argues for a different interpretation of this passage. One useful point he makes is that Russell 
is here concerned only with the axioms of the calculus of propositions, not with all of the princi-
ples that Russell calls logical axioms. Proops then further argues that the passage only aims to 
rule out a weaker “non-demonstrative independence proofs” and that it should not be taken to 
bear on the possibility of demonstrative independence proofs of those axioms. Whether this is a 
correct interpretation of the passage or not, Proops does not deny that Russell holds it to be im-
possible to coherently assume the falsity of the axioms of the propositional calculus. The argu-
ment on which Russell relies in making this point is not entirely clear, as Proops himself points 
out, but what Proops fails to emphasize is that whether Russell’s argument is successful or not, it 
is very clear that Russell accepted its conclusion, namely that (some) axioms of logic cannot be 
coherently denied. And it is also clear that the reasons Russell gives for this have to do with the 
role that these axioms play as principles of reasoning. So even Proops should not deny that the 
passage reflects Russell’s adherence to some form of the principle of Universality.
 See the literature cited in Footnote 7 above. Proops 2007 admits that among Russell’s texts, the 14
early Principles is the one to which some version of Universality must be ascribed.
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representations of the logical form of all thought. To better see what kind of view Wittgenstein 
rejects it would be helpful to briefly look at the alternative that he himself proposes. In the Trac-
tatus Wittgenstein construes the nature of the propositions of logic in a manner radically different 
from that in which he construes the contentful propositions that make up our scientific knowl-
edge (4.111, 6.111). He insists that logical propositions are empty of all content: they are sense-
less signs, mere “tautologies” (TLP 4.46). For unlike ordinary, contingent propositions, in logical 
propositions the representational relations to reality “cancel one another” (4.462). This does not 
mean that in Wittgenstein’s view logical propositions represent something other than the facts 
that can be ordinarily represented (as proponents of the standard reading might have it). Logical 
propositions fail to amount to any sort of picture at all, and it is only in a very attenuated sense 
that they deserve to be called propositions, or even to count as true or false. Thus in pre-Tractari-
an manuscripts Wittgenstein simply denies that logical propositions have a truth value, saying 
that they are “neither true nor false” (Wittgenstein 1984 109), and although by the time of writ-
ing the Tractatus he proposes to count tautologies as true and contradictions as false, he often 
uses scare-quotes in ascribing truth-values to them (TLP 6.125 and 6.1223).  
Though they are not representations of logical form, there is, for Wittgenstein, a different 
sense in which logical propositions can be said to make logical form manifest. A logical proposi-
tion such as “p v ~p” shows that this particular way of combining its elements renders the result 
empty of all content, no matter what content each of the elements might have when it appears in 
other contexts (TLP 6.121). But as Wittgenstein is quick to point out, it is not only through logi-
cal propositions that logical form shows itself — any proposition must be able to show its own 
logical form, for otherwise the proposition would not be a determinate, truth-evaluable represen-
tation at all. And since there is nothing that only logical propositions can express, they are in 
principle dispensable (6.122, 6.126), even if in practice, as Wittgenstein grants, they may be use-
ful (6.1262). For example, by means of logical equivalences such as De Morgan’s law, ~(p & q) 
≡ (~p v ~q), we can simplify what would otherwise be much more complicated chains of infer-
ences, e.g. the derivation of ~q from p and ~(p & q). The role of the logical proposition in this 
context is not to represent anything, but to facilitate substitutions and thereby to make our gen-
uine representations and the inferences that involve them more perspicuous.   15
Despite the rejection of Representability, however, Wittgenstein goes on in later parts of 
the Tractatus to introduce what he calls the general propositional form (4.5), in which the “es-
sence of all description” consists (5.4711); he proposes to spell out this form in terms of a vari-
able which any truth-functional combination of elementary propositions falls under (6). This is 
not the place to attempt to provide a full account of this idea; nonetheless, I wish to allay the 
worry that the introduction of such a variable violates the rejection of Representability. When 
Wittgenstein explains how variables can bring out what is characteristic of formal concepts (e.g. 
object, concept, fact, function, number; cf. 4.1272), he distinguishes the relation between a vari-
able and its instances from the relation between a concept and the objects that fall under it; the 
latter relation is precisely what descriptive propositions express, whereas the former is something 
 A parallel point applies to mathematical equations: they do not convey any facts, but instead 15
serve to facilitate substitutions and thereby to make our reasoning more perspicuous. See 6.211 
and Kremer 2002 298, as well as Diamond 2019 134.
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which is not said by propositions, but is shown by the fact that we accept one proposition as an 
appropriate substitution for another (4.126). Accordingly, whatever it is that the introduction of 
the variable which captures the general propositional form is meant to do—however we wish to 
construe the way this variable gives us an overview of propositional expressions, and thereby 
helps draw the limits of the significant use of language—it is clear that Wittgenstein does not 
mean, by its introduction, to provide a picture of the logical form of the propositions, or to pro-
vide a substantive characterization of the realm to which logic applies. For in order to do any-
thing like the latter, Wittgenstein reminds us, we would have to step “outside” logic (5.61).   16
4. Russell’s Response 
The way Russell responds to the reductio in the introduction he wrote for the Tractatus provides 
further support for the claim that Wittgenstein’s argument targets views endorsed by his prede-
cessors. Russell construes Wittgenstein’s argument as a standard reductio of the assumption of 
Representability. And he proposes to save this assumption by rejecting one of the other premises 
of the argument, namely Universality.  In consequence, Russell unleashes the regress which the 17
introduction of Universality blocked: 
These difficulties suggest to my mind some such possibility as this: that every 
language has, as Mr. Wittgenstein says, a structure concerning which in the lan-
guage, nothing can be said, but that there may be another language dealing with 
the structure of the first language, and having itself a new structure, and that to 
this hierarchy of languages there may be no limit. … Such an hypothesis is very 
difficult, and I can see objections to it which at the moment I do not know how 
to answer. I do not see how any easier hypothesis can escape from Mr. Wittgen-
stein’s conclusions. (Russell 1960 23)
Russell here suggests that one could represent the logical form of one language by employing 
another language, whose logical form is different from that of the first. He finds the conse-
quences of the rejection of universality difficult to swallow (which might plausibly be taken to 
indicate his own prior commitment to Universality), but he does not think that the regress is 
hopelessly absurd. Perhaps this is because he takes the regress to be merely “potential”, rather 
than an “actual” regress, such that it does not threaten the intelligibility of the very idea of lan-
 See Diamond 2011, who argues that the sole purpose that the specification of the variable (the 16
general form of the proposition) serves is to aid in the activity of the clarification of our use of 
language, and reaching such clarity does not depend on making any substantive claims about 
logical form or about language.
 One might also try to save the assumption in other ways, e.g. by rejecting Outsideness. But 17
Russell does not consider such alternatives, and for reasons of space I shall ignore them here. In 
the following sections I consider a different understanding of the nature of reductio arguments 
which disavows all moves of this kind. 
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guage.   18
But in fact it is quite unclear what Russell could mean in saying that each language in the 
hierarchy has a different structure (or a different logical form) than the one that precedes it 
(which is to be distinguished from the idea that each language is restricted to a single type of ob-
jects). If this is supposed to allow Russell to save Representability, each such linguistic structure 
would have to be incommensurable with the structure of any of the other languages in the hierar-
chy, since if there were anything in common to them all, then placing them in a hierarchy would 
not be of much help—there would still be this common infrastructural element that all languages 
presuppose, and which, by Outsideness, none of these languages are able to represent. But if 
there is no such common structure, by what right might Russell call any of them “language”? 
The intuition I would like to invoke here is the same one that Davidson (1974) famously draws 
on: by treating a putative language as incommensurable, and hence as untranslatable to one’s 
own, one loses the right to assume that what one is treating of is a language—a vehicle of repre-
sentation and thought—at all. Indeed, Russell seems, inconsistently, to imply that there is some-
thing common to all the languages in the hierarchy, since he says that each of them “deals” with 
some things which the others cannot deal with. But it is precisely this “dealing with”—that is, the 
common notion of representing—that Russell’s languages must not share, if the hierarchy is truly 
to provide an escape from the reductio.  
One might be tempted to help Russell to a less problematic construal of the hierarchy of 
languages, namely the one that modern semantic theory, going back to Tarski, draws on (e.g. 
Tarski 1944). But this would be anachronistic; let me briefly point out what I take to be the cru-
cial difference. Whereas Russell still assumes that the languages that make up the hierarchy are 
meaningful, interpreted languages, modern logicians sharply distinguish the syntax and seman-
tics of a language. The construction of the syntactic structures that make up the hierarchy does 
not presuppose any semantic notions; rather, the latter are subsequently defined in a way that 
makes them relative to each such system of signs. This is sufficient for overcoming the objection 
I raised with respect to Russell’s hierarchy: identifying each of the languages that make up the 
modern semantic hierarchy does not presuppose or imply that these languages involve any sin-
gle, semantic notion of representation, and so it does not imply that they share a common logical 
form.   19
To the extent that the modern semantic approach makes itself immune to Wittgenstein’s 
reductio, it achieves this by completely changing the subject. For unlike Russell’s hierarchy, the 
modern semantic approach severs the connections between the idea of language and the idea of 
representation, of reasoning, of thought and of inference, to which Russell still seems to hold on. 
Rather than vindicating Russell’s proposal, this reveals how radically one must break with Rus-
sell’s framework—how radically one must change the meanings of the terms underlying the as-
 For the distinction between potential and actual regress see Russell 1903 51.18
 Tarski’s reasons for introducing the hierarchy were different, of course: he was hoping to 19
thereby provide an adequate solution to the semantic paradoxes, particularly the liar paradox. 
Russell’s hierarchy would clearly fail to meet this goal, as well. By contrast, Carnap 2000 282 is 
explicitly concerned to show that the modern semantic approach is not vulnerable to the difficul-
ties raised by Wittgenstein’s reductio.
14
sumption that logical form can be represented—in order to bypass the difficulties exposed by the 
reductio.  What begins to emerge from these considerations is the shape of an alternative con20 -
strual of the role that reductio arguments may play. Namely, they may serve to manifest the need 
for a complete transformation of the terms in which a certain philosophical problem is couched; 
fully overcoming the contradiction exposed by the reductio requires the introduction of a radical-
ly new philosophical approach. I now turn to develop this construal of the reductio. 
5. The Alternative Construal of the Role of Reductio Arguments 
Russell’s way of responding to Wittgenstein’s reductio assumes that the sense of each of its 
premises and assumptions can be held fixed independently of that of the others. On Russell’s ap-
proach, despite the rejection of Universality, what the other premises say about logic and repre-
sentation and the very meaning of terms such as ‘represent’ (or ‘deal with’) and ‘logical form’ 
are supposed to remain unchanged. Similarly, on the standard construal of Wittgenstein’s argu-
ment, which can be found in Hacker, Geach and Nordmann, despite the rejection of Repre-
sentability, what the premises indicate is taken to be true, even though such truth cannot be prop-
erly represented.By contrast, I would now like to suggest a radically different way of construing 
the role of the Tractarian reductio, according to which what it shows is not that logical form can-
not be represented, but that no determinate sense has been given to the terms in which we frame 
the very question whether we can represent logical form.  A reductio argument, in this sense, 21
may signal the incoherence of the use of language in the context of which a certain philosophical 
problem (as well as the proposed solution to it) comes to seem meaningful. The proper response 
to this discovery is not the rejection of any single assumption, but the transformation of the lan-
guage, and therewith the overcoming of the illusion of meaningfulness to which that language 
gave rise. This is not to say that there are no contexts in which reductio arguments do function in 
the manner in which they are standardly construed, that is, contexts in which they serve as proofs 
that establish the falsity of a specific assumption without ushering any radical change of mean-
ing. Rather, the point is merely that there are certain contexts in which the effect of reductio ar-
guments is precisely such a transformation of language, and that Wittgenstein’s critique of Frege 
and Russell is one such context. 
The later Wittgenstein’s observations on the effects that proofs of impossibility may have 
on our understanding of the nature of a mathematical problem shed light on the idea, which as I 
will argue below is already present in the Tractatus, that demonstrating the unsolvability of a 
problem may prompt us to transform our use of language and thereby to realize that there was no 
 I return to reflect on the continuities and discontinuities in the history of modern logic in the 20
concluding section of this paper.  
 Both Sullivan 2004 34 and Conant 2007 56 point out (as a consideration against standard read21 -
ers) that whereas a reductio proof, standardly construed, establishes the falsity of a proposition 
that we understand, the Tractatus does not purport to establish the falsity of philosophical propo-
sitions, but to expose their nonsensicality, i.e. their not being propositions. This is correct, but as 
I will argue, there is an alternative way of construing the role of reductio arguments which per-
fectly fits the purpose of the Tractatus, so understood. 
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substantive problem there to be solved, in the first place.  One example that Wittgenstein re22 -
peatedly invokes in this connection is the trisection of the angle—a Euclidean problem that exer-
cised mathematical minds for millennia, until it was proven, in the 19th century, to be unsolv-
able. Wittgenstein draws our attention to the effect that the discovery of the proof that it is im-
possible to trisect the angle using Euclidean methods has on our description of what the mathe-
maticians who were bothered by this problem were up to: from our vantage point, to say that 
they were looking for the trisection of the angle would be quite misleading, since as we know, 
there really is not such a thing for which one might look (Wittgenstein 2009 §463-4). Rather, it 
seems more apt to say that they were guided by a defective grasp of what can be looked for; to 
make sense of their behavior, we must take them to have been under the illusion that certain 
combinations of words meant something determinate, and that by means of them they managed 
to pose an intelligible problem. Notably, prominent 19th century mathematicians themselves ob-
served, in considering such impossibility proofs, that they do not provide a solution to the origi-
nal problem, but rather transform our understanding of it. For rather than answering a question of 
the form “what is the solution…”, the impossibility proofs answer the question “is there a solu-
tion for…”. Thus David Hilbert observed that by means of such proofs certain problems “have 
finally found fully satisfactory and rigorous solutions, although in another sense than that origi-
nally intended”.  23
To avoid the contradiction that the reductio argument exposes we may choose to modify 
our language in different ways. For one, we can reject the problematic phrase from our language, 
by becoming alert to the fact that no determinate meaning has been assigned to phrases such as 
“the euclidean method for trisecting an angle”.  Alternatively, we can go on to alter our use of 24
words in such a way that the problematic expression remains in use but no longer leads us to the 
contradiction. Thus the pythagorean proof of the impossibility of finding the rational number 
whose square equals 2 (which may indeed be construed as a reductio) ultimately led mathemati-
cians to reject the idea that any number must be expressible as a ratio of two whole numbers, but 
it did not lead them to stop assuming that the phrase “the square root of 2” is meaningful (though 
we can imagine different languages and different mathematical systems which would result had 
they chosen the latter response). The effect of such impossibility proofs is thus not to provide an 
answer to the original problem, but to make that problem disappear.  
It is worth recalling that Frege and Russell themselves see the presence of a contradiction 
in a system of thought as an indication for the indeterminacy of the use of language that under-
lies such a system, and they thereby anticipate Wittgenstein’s construal of the effect that reductio 
 See Wittgenstein 1974 387-392, Wittgenstein 2009 §334 and §§463-4; the effects of reductio 22
in the mathematical context is further discussed in Wittgenstein 1975 184–185, Wittgenstein 
1976 86–9, and Wittgenstein 1978 185 and 371. For  insightful discussions, see Diamond 1991c 
and Floyd 1995. 
 Hilbert 1901, cited in Lützen 2009 390.23
 Cf. Wittgenstein 2009 §500: “When a sentence is called senseless, it is not, as it were, its sense 24
that is senseless. Rather, a combination of words is being excluded from the language, withdrawn 
from circulation.”
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arguments may have. As I noted above, both Frege and Russell object to the use of indirect 
proofs in logic, for the reason that the assumption of the falsity of a logical axiom threatens the 
soundness of our reasoning.  Frege, in particular, sees the presence of a contradiction, even 25
when it is artificially produced in the context of a proof, as an indication that one has not made a 
fully meaningful use of language. Thus in the context of his polemic against Hilbert, Frege com-
plains that in Hilbert’s proofs of the independence of the geometrical axioms, “the word ‘axiom’, 
as [Hilbert] uses it, fluctuates from one sense to another without his noticing it” (Frege 1979c 
247). In other words, Hilbert seems to Frege to suffer from what the Tractatus would later diag-
nose as the marks of philosophical nonsense: an indeterminate use of words which sustains an 
illusion of meaning (TLP 5.4733).  26
Wittgenstein suggests that it is not merely difficult, but impossible to retrospectively 
specify what one took one’s words to mean, after one has realized that their words imply a con-
tradiction. When this is discovered, Wittgenstein observes, what one is prone to say is “That’s 
not the way I meant it” (Wittgenstein 2009 §125; cf. §334). In other words, one is driven to com-
pletely retract what one originally meant so as to render one’s past behavior coherent in light of 
one’s present understanding. Only after such a revision has taken place can one be said to truly 
mean anything determinate by one’s words; whereas before it, and before the contradiction was 
made explicit, one cannot be said to have meant anything determinate by it, at all. 
Note, moreover, that reductio argument themselves draws on the terms whose indetermi-
nacy they lead their target audience to acknowledge and overcome. That is, the expressions that 
make up the argument are janus-faced.  For those whose language the argument aims to trans27 -
form, each of these expressions may not seem problematic at first, at least not until the moment 
at which the contradiction is revealed; so they would take the argument to bring out compelling 
inferential relations between these putatively meaningful expressions. But for us, who are no 
longer caught up in that defective use of language, the steps made in the argument may no longer 
appear to be motivated at all. Since we have undergone the relevant transformation, and reached 
greater clarity, we may no longer take the argument to expose a contradiction in our language. 
Indeed, since our language has already transformed in ways that prevent the contradiction from 
arising, we can simply throw away the argument, along with the indeterminate uses of language 
that it led us to overcome. Nothing substantive would thereby be lost. 
This construal of the role of reductio arguments thus helps clarify what the Tractarian re-
ductio is meant to achieve, and how well it serves the declared aims of the Tractatus as the reso-
lute reading understands them. Such arguments serve to draw our attention to the indeterminacies 
that underly our use of language, and indeed it is these indeterminacies which, according to the 
Tractatus, are the source of our apparent philosophical problems (TLP 3.323-3.324, 4.003 and 
 See section 3, above. 25
 It is a separate question whether or not Frege is correct to think that Hilbert’s proof procedures 26
involve assuming the falsity of an axiom, and whether his use of the word “axiom” is indeed in-
determinate. For a discussion of the complex issues involved here, see Tappenden 2000.
 For the related idea that in the context of Tractarian elucidations the use of signs is merely 27
“transitional” see Diamond 2000 157.
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6.53); the task of philosophical elucidation is to render our expressions clearer (cf. 4.112), that is, 
to alter our use of language, and thereby to make these apparent problems disappear (cf. 6.521). 
As a result of such a transformation of our language, Wittgenstein reasons, the elucidatory ex-
pressions themselves would come to be recognized as nonsensical, and thus be thrown away 
(6.54). The effect these elucidations would have on us—the clarity in the use of language that we 
would thereby gain—would be revealed by our no longer feeling the desire to speak in those 
problematic ways (7). 
The Tractarian reductio with which this paper is concerned is but one of several lines of 
arguments in the Tractatus in which Wittgenstein pursues this program. To very briefly mention 
one other clear example, in the 5.53s Wittgenstein argues that it is only because of confusions 
surrounding the interpretation of the identity sign that Russell was pushed to introduce the axiom 
of infinity, and that this axiom itself gives rise to further irresolvable problems. Wittgenstein then 
proposes to address the difficulty by transforming our language in a manner which would allow 
us to dispense with the identity sign; as a result, he argues, all of the problems surrounding the 
axiom of infinity would disappear (5.535). However, in order to spell out this suggestion, e.g. in 
oder to clarify what it is that the identity sign is not required to expressed, Wittgenstein himself 
must engage in ways of speaking that are bound to mislead (cf. 4.1272). So his own elucidations 
of identity must be thrown away, once they have achieved their goal, namely once we have 
adopted a new use of language in which the old problems of identity no longer arise, and in 
which there is no longer any need for such elucidations. 
6. The Alternative Construal of the Tractarian Reductio: The First Step 
Our situation in philosophy, according to the Tractatus, is just like the one in which mathemati-
cians find themselves before they have discovered that their assumptions lead to a contradiction, 
and hence before they have realized the need to revise the terms they draw on in their assump-
tions. As we have just seen, it is the official aim of the Tractatus to expose the unnoticed ambigu-
ities and indeterminacies that underlie the nonsensical propositions of philosophy, and to lead us, 
by means of elucidations, to overcome the appearance that the problems which these proposi-
tions purport to answer are genuine problems. The Tractarian reductio is designed to serve this 
goal insofar as it shows that the idea of representing logical form is incoherent, and that its philo-
sophical attraction is merely illusory. Representability only appears to make sense because of the 
indeterminacy in the use of words with which this idea has been framed. The kind of transforma-
tion of language with which Wittgenstein proposes to remedy this defect does not consist in our 
coming to see Representability as false; rather, it consists in our no longer taking this assumption 
to make any sense, and hence in our throwing it away, removing it from our language.  
With this in mind, let us reconsider the first step of the Tractarian reductio. Wittgenstein 
here seems to argue, on the basis of Common Form and Outsideness, that it is impossible for a 
picture to represent its own form of representation. But upon further reflection, I will now show, 
what he brings us to see is that the thought of making such a representation is neither true nor 
false, but incoherent.  
On Wittgenstein’s view, pictures are individuated not only by reference to the elements 
and structure that make up the depicting fact, but also by reference to the form of representation 
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that is employed in “projecting” such a fact onto the depicted fact. Consider, in this connection, 
the case of the Necker cube, discussed at TLP 5.5423: 
  
  
On one way of seeing it, this diagram represents one cube (the one in which the points marked 
with ‘a’ make up the face closest to the viewer), while on another way of seeing it, it represents 
another cube (the one in which the points marked with ‘b’ form the face closest to the viewer).  28
Representing each of the two distinct cubes requires a distinct form of representation, by means 
of which the same spatial structure — the same arrangement of points and lines — combine into 
a representation of a different content. These two distinct forms of representation cannot them-
selves be elements of a single pictorial fact, for if they were, we would not be able to see it as 
representing once this cube, once that cube, where in each case we only have in view one com-
pletely determinate cube. Indeed, if you try to situate both represented cubes in a single three-
dimensional coordinate system, it will become evident that not all of their vertices coincide. This 
shows that in the uninterpreted diagram, each point is merely an ambiguous sign, which is used 
in different ways in each of the two pictures, to depict different spatial locations. It is only in the 
context of each of the working pictures of each of the two cubes that each point in the diagram 
truly counts as a symbol for a determinate spatial location. Conversely, it is only by equivocation 
that we call the diagram “the Necker cube”, as though it were a single, determinate picture of any 
cube. The diagram, considered apart from its interpretations, i.e. considered apart from the two 
forms of representation that may be employed in order to project it unto a three dimensional 
space, is not yet a picture.  
This point extends to representation in general. When it comes to language, Wittgenstein 
distinguishes the mere sign from the significant symbol, and argues that the meaning of signs can 
only be identified when one considers their role within the context of the significant use of a 
propositional picture (TLP 3.3, 3.321). According to Wittgenstein, it is precisely by failing to pay 
heed to such shifts in the context of use and by ignoring the ambiguities that result from them 
that the attraction of philosophical nonsense is sustained (3.323-3.324, 5.4733).   29
In view of these distinctions, suppose that there could be a single spatial picture which 
depicted its own form of representation. To do that, it would have to serve two radically distinct 
roles. Qua spatial picture, it would have to employ a form of representation that correlates spatial 
 With a little more difficulty, we can even see it as a two-dimensional hexagon with lines run28 -
ning through it. For the sake of brevity, I leave this possibility out of account here. 
 On Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of philosophical nonsense see Diamond 1991b 197 as well as Co29 -
nant and Diamond 2004 62.
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aspects of the depicting fact with spatial aspects of the fact that it depicts. But qua representation 
of a form of representation, it would have to employ a form of representation that correlates a 
spatial fact with a fact of a different order of complexity, i.e. the fact which consists in the corre-
lation between two spatial facts. The difference can be illustrated as follows:  
spatial picture spatial picture 
 ↓  ↓ 
spatial fact  (spatial picture ——> spatial fact) 
Inasmuch as a spatial picture performs the first role, it employs a form of representation that is 
simply not cut out for performing the second. And even if a single pictorial fact might seem to 
perform two such radically distinct roles, keeping in mind the lesson learned from the discussion 
of the Necker diagram, we should understand such a fact as a merely ambiguous and indetermi-
nate sign, which takes part in two distinct pictures, rather than counting it as a single picture that 
represents its own form of representation. 

In the specific case under consideration in the first step of the Tractarian reductio, a 
philosophically tempting idea seems to suggest itself in the phrase “a picture which represents its 
own form of representation.” Its attractiveness depends, however, on our failing to notice the 
ambiguity of the expressions that appear in this phrase (particularly, “a picture” and “its own 
form”). The standard reading of Wittgenstein’s argument takes the phrase to refer to a coherently 
specified possibility, which the first step of the reductio shows not to be realizable. But if the 
phrase cannot be unabmiguously read as referring to any single picture, then what we are ulti-
mately meant to realize is not the truth or falsity, but the nonsensicality of the claim that a picture 
cannot represent its own form of representation.  
7. The Alternative Construal of the Tractarian Reductio: The Second Step 
One of indeterminacies of meaning which the second step of the Tractarian reductio exposes 
comes to the surface in step (D) of the argument, where we explicitly entertain the possibility of 
a representation (of logical form) that has nothing in common with what it purports to represent. 
But the very idea that we can call anything a representation while depriving it of even the most 
minimal correlation with that which it represents disintegrates upon reflection. In other words, in 
proposing that we could represent logic illogically, we lose our grip on the very idea of represen-
tation. Indeed, the indeterminacy that becomes explicit at this point runs through the entire ar-
gument, all the way back to its starting point, Representability. For to say that (and similarly to 
ask whether) we can represent logical form involves a merely equivocal use of the terms “logical 
form” and “represent”. In saying it, we purport to distinguish the form and content of a single, 
determinate representation of something which is distinct from it, but we then take that form to 
be the content that that picture represents. It is worth noting that the ambiguous manner in which 
we treat logical form in this context is reminiscent of the kind of confusion Frege criticizes when 
he argues that in attempting to speak about concepts and distinguish them from objects (e.g. by 
saying “no concept is an object”) we willy-nilly talk of concepts as though they were objects 
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which fall under first-order predicates, and in doing so we distort their essentially predicative 
nature; as a result, we fail to say anything determinate about concepts.  Analogously, in speak30 -
ing of logical form as that which is represented by a proposition whose form it is, we ignore the 
formal role it is supposed to play in that representation, namely that of enabling the correlation of 
the picture and what it depicts. 
Given the ambiguities that underly it, Representability cannot truly be taken to specify 
any determinate possibility that we should affirm or deny, and its negation in (E) is just as inde-
terminate as it. Both are nonsense, in the specific sense that we have failed to assign the signs 
they involve a determinate meaning (TLP 6.53), “even if we believe that we have done so” 
(5.4733). Indeed, the indeterminacy in the use of the expressions “logical form” and “representa-
tion” casts doubt on the intelligibility of the other principles on which the argument depends—
Common Form, Outsideness and Universality. In framing them, too, our words did not succeed 
in saying anything, either rightly or falsely. The reductio fulfills its role as soon as it dispels the 
illusory appearance that they did. 
This construal of the Tractarian reductio neatly exemplifies the kind of elucidatory activi-
ty that 4.112 and 6.54 describe as the method of the book, and it is in this respect that my inter-
pretation speaks in favor of the resolute reading of the Tractatus, and against its standard read-
ing. The standard readers of the Tractarian reductio construe its upshot as the denial of an intelli-
gible but false assumption, namely that logical form can be represented. The reductio proves, for 
such readers, that attempts to represent logical form would fail, and that the expression of such 
failure would consist in nonsense; but it is not nonsensical, according to standard readers, to say 
of these failed expressions what it is they fail in, namely the representation of logical form.  By 31
contrast, the Tractarian reductio, on my construal, and in line with the resolute reading, might 
initially seem to its reader to rely on substantive premises from which one then derives a conclu-
sion, but it is ultimately meant to lead the reader to realize that the premises which they took to 
be meaningful lacked a determinate sense. They are nonsense, on this construal, not because they 
manage to determinately refer to logical form and fail to say something which cannot be said of 
it, but rather because there is no determinate “it” that they say anything about.  In other words, 32
the goal that philosophers such as Frege and Russell have set themselves, to represent logical 
form, was no goal at all—even if their language allowed them to frame phrases that gave the ap-
pearance that it were. But since nothing was determinately meant by such expressions, nothing 
substantive is being denied when these expressions are rejected as nonsensical; just as we do not 
feel deprived of anything when we are told that we cannot “put an event into a hole”.  33
Indeed, standard readers take Wittgenstein to hold that his own elucidatory propositions, 
despite their nonsensicality, are not “mere nonsense”, but nonsense which somehow conveys a 
 See Frege 1984a 186 ff.; and cf. TLP 4.126-4.1272.30
 E.g. Geach 1976; Hacker 2001a; Williams 2004 and Nordmann 2005.31
 Resolute readers similarly reject the idea that we can determinately say what it is of which 32
something cannot be said, and that anything determinate is left of the idea of logical form once 
we have overcome our initial confusion; see Diamond 1991b 181 and 198, Kremer 2001 42, and 
Conant and Diamond 2004 65.
 This example of nonsense is discussed in Wittgenstein 1984 108. 33
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determinate content, namely that which it tries to say, but cannot.  Without this, it seems to the 34
standard reader, it would not be possible to explain how the author of the Tractatus could hope to 
achieve any philosophical aim whatsoever by means of his nonsensical elucidations. This as-
sumption underlies the way Peter Hacker, the main proponent of the standard reading, responds 
to the resolute reading. Hacker seems to think that the resolute readers themselves take Wittgen-
stein to advance an argument whose conclusion is that elucidatory expressions are mere nonsense 
and must be thrown away; he then objects that such an argument would depend for its success on 
premises that are conveyed by Wittgenstein’s elucidatory propositions, i.e. by means of expres-
sions which the resolute readers take Wittgenstein to ultimately repudiate, but which cannot be 
thrown away if such an argument is to succeed (Hacker 2001a 113). Hacker here assumes that 
there is nothing else that elucidations might be taken to do, apart from supplying premises for an 
argument of this sort. But this mischaracterizes the way the resolute reading conceives of the 
work of elucidation. 
Cora Diamond argues, in response to Hacker’s objection, that the effect which the Tracta-
tus strives to achieve—the effect which I here described in terms of the transformation of the 
language of the philosopher—does not relate to the elucidations that bring this effect about in the 
same way that a conclusion of an argument relates to the premises from which it follows; clarity, 
once achieved, is not undermined by throwing away the ladder of unclear propositions which led 
to it (Diamond 2014 17). The alternative construal of Wittgenstein’s reductio that I propose helps 
clarify how elucidations do that. The steps in the reductio draw on the language which they ulti-
mately lead us to transform, and to that extent they themselves involve indeterminate uses of 
language. The apparent contradiction the reductio exposes manifests the defects of our current 
use language; and once we transform that language and overcome those defects we may come to 
see the argument itself as defective. But in realizing this and in throwing the argument away, 
along with the philosophical expressions whose nonsensicality the argument made manifest, we 
would not be repudiating the clarity that we achieved—rather, we would thereby reaffirm it.  
8. Conclusion 
The true force of Wittgenstein’s reductio, on the reading proposed in this paper, does not consist 
in refuting the assumption that logic can be represented, on the basis of other assumptions which 
are grounded in ineffable insights. Rather, its force consists in making manifest the need for a 
thoroughgoing transformation of the philosophical language within which all these assumptions 
seem to make sense. Once this transformation is complete, the question concerning the repre-
sentability of logical form would no longer seem relevant, and the appearance that in order to 
answer it we must rely on ineffable insights into the nature of logic and representation would 
equally lose its force. Of course the very expression “representation of logical form” might then 
go on to acquire a different, benign meaning. But if it does, that meaning would no longer be the 
one that Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein’s standard readers expect this phrase to have.
We can see the modern semantic approach to logic as one way in which such a transfor-
mation of Frege’s and Russell’s philosophical language can be achieved; a distinctive feature of 
this modern approach is that it severs the internal connection between logic and thought which 
 See e.g. Hacker 2001a 111 and esp. 140: “What one means when one tries to state these in34 -
sights is perfectly correct, but the endeavour must unavoidably fail.”
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informs, in various ways, Frege’s, Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s work. We must be wary, however, 
of treating the modern semantic approach as the only, necessary consequence of the history 
which preceded it. Indeed, the historical development of modern logic can be fruitfully compared 
with the kind of scientific revolutions with which Kuhn (1962) is concerned; this is what van 
Heijenoort seems to point to, in saying that modern logical theory evolved by making a “sharp 
break with the Frege-Russell approach to the foundations of logic” (1967 328). Whether it might 
still be possible for us nowadays to conceive of logic in terms of its role for thought, and yet nei-
ther to equivocate in our use of these words nor to appeal to mysterious intuitions of the ineffa-
ble, remains an open question. My hope in this paper has been to make clear that this was the 
issue with which Wittgenstein was concerned.  
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